International outsourcing in a two-Sector Heckscher-Ohlin model by Egger, H
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2002
International outsourcing in a two-Sector Heckscher-Ohlin
model
Egger, H
Egger, H (2002). International outsourcing in a two-Sector Heckscher-Ohlin model. Journal of Economic
Integration, 17(4):689-709.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Journal of Economic Integration 2002, 17(4):689-709.
Egger, H (2002). International outsourcing in a two-Sector Heckscher-Ohlin model. Journal of Economic
Integration, 17(4):689-709.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Journal of Economic Integration 2002, 17(4):689-709.
International outsourcing in a two-Sector Heckscher-Ohlin
model
Abstract
This paper analyzes the distributional effects of international outsourcing in a two sector
Heckscher-Ohlin type model if both sectors get economical access to cost-saving international
outsourcing. Thereby, it is shown that if both sectors are engaged in international outsourcing in
equilibrium, the cost-saving effects of outsourcing as well as the factor contents of the outsourced
fragments are relevant for the factor price effects. Concerning the Pareto-criterion the main finding is
that a Pareto-improving factor price impact of international outsourcing cannot be excluded from a
theoretical point of view. 
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1 Introduction 
In the public and political discussion of industrialized economies opponents of globalization 
typically argue that globalization increases inequality. The fear is that firms try to exploit 
international factor price differences across economies by outsourcing (low-skilled) labor 
intensive parts of the value added chain to foreign. The conclusion is that a substitution of 
expensive home-supplied (low-skilled) labor by cheap foreign factors improves the income of 
capital owners at the cost of (low-skilled) labor. In contrast, proponents of globalization argue 
that the gains from the more efficient allocation of resources are so large that winners could 
fully compensate losers. 
In the last decade the question of the distributional effects of international outsourcing has 
also reached the scientific discussion of economists. Jones (2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski 
(1990, 2001) have argued that technological changes have decreased the costs for service 
links required for coordination and communication activities, implying an intensified 
fragmentation of production processes. In particular, they stress that besides tariffs and legal 
non-tariff barriers such technological changes may account for the observed increase in 
international specialization.1 However, starting with Krugman (1995) international 
outsourcing is nowadays debated as alternative candidate to skill-biased technological change 
for explaining the increasing wage gap observed in the United States. Compare Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996a, 1996b) and Slaughter (2000) for empirical assessments. Using a wide 
measure of outsourcing including all imported intermediate and final goods that are used of, 
or sold under the brandname of, an American firm (p. 107) Feenstra and Hanson estimate a 
significant and large effect of the increase in international outsourcing on the U.S. wage 
differential in favor of high-skilled workers. In contrast, Slaughter does not find any large 
impact of international outsourcing in his examination of multinational enterprises 
headquartered in the USA. 
In the theoretical discussion Arndt (1997, 1999) challenged the conclusion which may be 
drawn from the theoretical discussion in Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1997), namely that 
international outsourcing by substituting the relative scarce factor of an economy depresses 
demand for the scarce factor. According to the analysis of Arndt, the factor price implications 
                                                 
1 According to Kohler (2001b), [t]his new pattern of specialization is perhaps best characterized as being 
driven by worldwide arbitrage operating (...) on ever smaller slices of the value added chain (p. 2). 
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of international outsourcing critically depend on the input characteristics of the sector in 
which international outsourcing takes place. If the labor intensive sector gets via international 
outsourcing access to cheap labor abroad it is labor which gains relative to capital. The 
intuition behind this result is the following. Access to cheap factors abroad makes firms in the 
capital intensive sector more competitive so that they expand production. According to Arndt, 
the positive employment effect resulting from the expansion in production outweighs the 
negative effect of substituting home labor by foreign labor.2 Since it turns out that under 
diversification the impact of international outsourcing on factor prices is independent of the 
factor intensity of the imported intermediate good, and solely determined by the factor 
intensity of the sector which is engaged in outsourcing activities relative to the other sector, 
the impact of international outsourcing is said to be sector-biased, in contrast to the factor-
biased impact predicted by in Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997). 3 In a more general 
framework Jones (2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) analyze a number of possible 
factor price effects of international outsourcing. Venables (1999) shows that even in a two-
sector model the distributional effects of international outsourcing are ambiguous, stressing 
thereby that it is possible to generate some curious cases (p. 943). 
The issue of international outsourcing and factor price equalization is discussed in Deardorff 
(2001a, 2001b). Thereby, Deardorff (2001a) stresses that international fragmentation (of the 
value-added chain) enhances the possibility of factor price equalization (p. 133f.), whereas 
Deardorff (2001b) argues that if fragmentation does not equalize factor prices across 
countries, it is not necessarily the case that factor prices move closer together. 
Concerning the welfare effects of international outsourcing the analysis in Heckscher-Ohlin 
type models identifies a welfare gain which allows for redistributional measures to 
compensate the losers of outsourcing. Kohler (2001a) has questioned the generality of this 
result by showing that in a specific factors Ricardo-Viner framework, fixed costs of 
international outsourcing may yield a welfare decline in the home country. 
                                                 
2 However, as Egger and Egger (2001) have shown the result that labor gains relative to capital is not generally 
valid but critically depends on special assumptions which have to be assessed empirically. 
3 Neither Arndt (1997, 1999) nor Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1996b) use the terms factor bias and sector bias. 
Kohler (2001a) introduced these terms into the discussion of international outsourcing. In the literature the 
discussion on whether it is the factor bias or the sector bias which matters is not new but well-known from the 
discussion of the channels through which technological progress affects the income distribution of an economy. 
According to Feenstra and Hanson, this debate has resulted in an apparent conflict in the literature (p. 908). 
Whereas Leamer (1998) argues that the sector bias is relevant in a small open economy, Krugman (2000) points 
out that in a closed or large open economy it is the factor bias which matters. 
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In this paper I extend the literature building on two sector Heckscher-Ohlin type models with 
two (types of) primary factors in use by assuming that international outsourcing 
simultaneously occurs in both sectors. Following the formal analysis in Egger and Falkinger 
(2001) I argue that international outsourcing provides economical access to a new production 
technology which not only uses home-supplied inputs but also an imported intermediate good. 
Thus, by substituting foreign for home factors, international outsourcing may alter (at given 
factor prices) the optimal factor intensity of primary inputs in the production process.4 In 
contrast to Egger and Falkinger (2001) and similar to Arndt (1997a, 1997b) I focus on 
diversified equilibria. 
Although the analysis of international outsourcing is similar to the analysis of technological 
change, there are two main differences. First, as already mentioned above, international 
outsourcing means access to a set of inputs which is different from that in the absence of 
outsourcing. This point is made clear in the analysis by allowing for four technologies in the 
non-outsourcing situation. Firms of both sectors may in the absence of outsourcing 
opportunities choose between an integrated and a fragmented mode of production. If 
international outsourcing becomes economically attractive, firms can additionally decide to 
use intermediate goods produced in home or imported from abroad in the fragmented 
production process. Second, whereas technological change normally shifts at given input 
prices optimal factor intensities (either only in one sector or) in both sectors in the same 
direction, international outsourcing may substitute different factors in the two production 
sectors, implying that (at given factor prices) optimal factor intensities of the two sectors can 
move in opposite directions. Thus, access to international outsourcing can alter the ranking of 
sectors according to their factor intensities also in the case of diversification equilibria.5 
Concerning the Pareto-criterion, the analysis in this paper confirms the view that economical 
access to cost-saving international outsourcing in a Heckscher-Ohlin type model exhibits a 
potential for a Pareto-improvement by redistributional measures of the government, i.e. 
winners gain more than losers lose. This is a direct consequence of the more efficient 
                                                 
4 Seeing outsourcing in this way is in line with the literature. Compare for instance Feenstra and Hanson (1999). 
Feenstra (1998) stresses that outsourcing has a qualitatively similar effect on reducing the demand for unskilled 
relative to skilled labor within an industry as does skill-biased technological change (p. 41). Throughout the 
paper I distinguish between non-outsourcing technologies (production modes in the absence of outsourcing) and 
outsourcing technologies (production modes if foreign resources are available via international outsourcing). 
5 Egger and Falkinger (2001) have shown that, if only one sector gets access to outsourcing opportunities, a 
change in the ranking of sectors according to their factor intensities is inconsistent with a diversified outsourcing 
equilibrium. 
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allocation of resources implied by international outsourcing. However, in contrast to the 
literature restricted on outsourcing in one sector, it is shown that international outsourcing 
may yield a Pareto-improvement (without any redistribution) in the home country if non-
outsourcing technologies are totally substituted by outsourcing ones and the cost-saving effect 
of international outsourcing (at given factor prices) in the two sectors is not too different. 
Concerning the theoretical analysis and the graphical tools, I prefer the dual approach with a 
diagrammatic representation of unit isocost curves in the factor price space instead of the 
Lerner-Pearce diagram. This approach is motivated by Mussa (1979) who stated that this 
diagrammatic technique (...) is particularly useful in illustrating the properties of the two 
sector model which are essentially concerned with prices (p. 525).6 
Section 2 characterizes the basic model. Section 3 determines the diversified non-outsourcing 
and outsourcing equilibria. Section 4 identifies the distributional effects of international 
outsourcing and section 5 deals with the Pareto-criterion in the context of outsourcing. After 
some extensions in section 6, section 7 summarizes the main findings. 
2 Model Characterization 
Consider a small open economy in which production is diversified on two sectors, that 
produce output 1X  and 2X  by employing two primary factors K  and L . All markets are 
perfectly competitive and primary factors are mobile across sectors but internationally 
immobile. The factor endowments of the economy are constant and given by K  and L . I 
assume that firms in both sectors have technological access to an integrated and a fragmented 
mode of production and that all production functions are linearly homogenous with strictly 
increasing and strictly quasiconcave unit cost functions. 
2.1 Non-Outsourcing Technologies 
Output in sector 1,2i =  is produced subject to technology 
 ( ),i i f fi iX F K L=  (1) 
                                                 
6 Feenstra and Hanson (1999) used the dual approach in their discussion on the impact of technologies on factor 
prices. However, in the literature on international outsourcing in the Heckscher-Ohlin model the Lerner Pearce 
diagram is the standard graphical tool for analyzing the distributional consequences of a splitting up of the value 
added chain. 
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if firms in sector i make use of the integrated production mode. If in contrast, the fragmented 
mode of production is in use the production of output iX  is subject to a production function 
of the form7 
( ) ( )( )1 1 1 2 2 2, , ,i i g g g gi i i i i iX G G K L G K L= . (2) 
1
iG  and 
2
iG  are the amounts of two fragments entering the production of commodity 
iX . iG  
describes the assembling technology. Let 
( ) ( ) ( ), , ,f f fi K L K i K L L i K Lc w w w k w w w l w w≡ +  (3) 
be the minimal unit costs of production for firms in sector i, which produce in an integrated 
way, according to (1). /f f ii ik K X≡  and /
f f i
i il L X≡  are cost-minimal input coefficients of 
the integrated production mode. Kw  and Lw  denote prices of the two factors K and L. 
Accordingly, let 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,g g gi K L K i K L L i K Lc w w w k w w w l w w≡ +  (4) 
be the minimal unit costs of fragmented production in sector i. Thereby, 
( )1 2 /g g g ii i ik K K X≡ +  and ( )1 2 /g g g ii i il L L X≡ +  are cost-minimal input coefficients of the 
fragmented production mode. 
2.2 Outsourcing Technology 
To preclude that one industry leaves the home country altogether, I assume that the foreign 
economy has neither access to the technology for producing intermediate good 1iG  nor access 
to assembling technology iG , 1,2i = . The latter implies that final assembly remains at home.8 
According to (2), the production of output iX  is subject to the production function 
 ( ) ( )( )1 * * *, , ,i i i i i i i iX G G K K G K L= γ γ  (5) 
                                                 
7 Note that I do not distinguish between national outsourcing and fragmentation within firms. (Compare for a 
formal distinction Egger and Falkinger, 2001). Therefore, fragmented production can also be associated with 
national outsourcing (in contrast to international outsourcing discussed below). 
8 Compare for a similar assumption Kohler (2001a). 
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if firms totally substitute fragment 2iG  by the imported intermediate good 
*
iG .
9 *iK  and 
*
iL  
denote foreign factors. Be aware that (5) allows for the possibility that the foreign country 
uses a technology different from ( )2iG ⋅  in the production of fragment *iG . Let 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* *
* * * *
, , , ,
, , , ,
i K L i K i K L i
L i K L i i i K L i
c w w c w k w w c
w l w w c c g w w c
γ γ
γ
≡
+ +
 (6) 
be the minimal unit cost function of outsourcing firms in sector i. Thereby, *ic  are the costs of 
an imported unit of intermediate good *iG . 
*
ic  depends on given foreign factor prices and any 
trade costs. / ii ik K X≡
γ γ , / ii il L X≡
γ γ  and * * / ii ig G X≡  are the cost-minimal input 
coefficients for outsourcing firms active in sector i. 
2.3 Factor Intensities 
Optimal intensities of (home-supplied) primary factors used in the integrated and fragmented 
production mode of sector 1,2i =  are given by 
 ( ) ( )( )
,
,
,
f
i K Lf
i K L f
i K L
k w w
w w
l w w
φ ≡  and (7) 
 ( ) ( )( )
,
,
,
g
i K Lg
i K L g
i K L
k w w
w w
l w w
φ ≡ , (8) 
respectively, according to (3) and (4). Moreover, under international outsourcing, we obtain 
 ( ) ( )( )
*
*
, ,
,
, ,
g
i K L i
i K L g
i K L i
k w w c
w w
l w w c
γφ ≡ , (9) 
according to (6). Note that ( )iγφ ⋅  is independent of *ic , which is a direct consequence of the 
separability of ( )iG ⋅ . In the following, I assume that the single crossing condition of unit 
isocost curves in the ( ),K Lw w -space holds, thereby refraining from any factor intensity 
reversals of primary inputs. Formally, this assumption can be characterized in the following 
way. Let 
                                                 
9 For simplicity, I assume that individual firms do not simultaneously use 2giG  and 
*
iG  in the (fragmented) 
production of commodity iX . Compare (2) and (5). 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , ,f f g gK γ γ= φ ⋅ φ ⋅ φ ⋅ φ ⋅ φ ⋅ φ ⋅  
be the set of optimal factor intensities of primary inputs in sectors 1 and 2 for the different 
production modes, according (7)-(9). No factor intensity reversal means that for any pair 
( ) ( ) K′κ ⋅ ≠ κ ⋅ ∈  the following property holds: If ( ) ( ), ,K L K Lw w w w′κ κ  for some Kw , Lw  
then ( ) ( ), ,K L K Lw w w w′ ′ ′ ′ ′κ κ  for all other Kw′ , Lw′ . In words the ranking of different modes 
of production according to their factor intensities is independent of changes in Kw  and Lw . 
3 Equilibria 
3.1 The Non-Outsourcing Equilibrium 
Define for any given ( ),K Lw w  
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, min , , ,a f gi K L i K L i K Lc w w c w w c w w≡ . (10) 
Then, factor prices in a diversified non-outsourcing equilibrium aKw  and 
a
Lw  are determined 
by the zero profit conditions 
 ( ) 11 ,a K Lc w w p=  and (11) 
 ( ) 22 ,a K Lc w w p= . (12) 
Factor markets have to be cleared in equilibrium, i.e. ( )f gi ii K K K+ =  and 
( )f gi ii L L L+ = , where 1 2g g gi i iK K K= +  and 1 2g g gi i iL L L= +  denote total employment of K 
and L in the fragmented production of sector i. Thereby, 0giK =  and 0
g
iL =  if 
( ) ( ), ,f a a g a ai K L i K Lc w w c w w<  and equivalently 0fiK =  and 0fiL =  if 
( ) ( ), ,f a a g a ai K L i K Lc w w c w w> . The full employment conditions determine equilibrium outputs. 
To make the analysis more tractable, from now on I assume ( ) ( ), ,f a a g a ai K L i K Lc w w c w w≠ . Then, 
in the non-outsourcing equilibrium sector 1 is said to be the K-intensive one if 
( ) ( )1 2, ,a aK L K Lw w w wφ > φ , with aiφ , 1,2i = , being defined as 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
, if , ,
,
, if , ,
f a a a f a a
i K L i K L i K La
i K L g a a a g a a
i K L i K L i K L
w w c w w c w w
w w
w w c w w c w w
φ =φ ≡ φ =
, (13) 
according to (7), (8) and (10).10 
The non-outsourcing equilibrium is represented by figure 1, where sector 1 is assumed to be 
the K-intensive one.11 In figure 1 set G  describes the feasible set and set GF  its lower 
frontier, which contains all possible equilibrium ( ),K Lw w  combinations.12 Note that, 
according to figure 1, set G  contains all combinations of factor prices ,K Lw w  that satisfy the 
constraints ( )a iic p⋅ ≥ , 1,2i = . A formal characterization of feasible set G  and frontier GF  is 
given in the appendix. 
Now, consider point A in figure 1. aiv  denotes the vector which is at factor prices 
a
Kw , 
a
Lw  
perpendicular to the unit cost contour ( ),a ii K Lc w w p= , 1,2i = . Moreover, v  is the vector 
which is in point A perpendicular to line φ , which indicates the relative factor endowment of 
home. Then, a diversified equilibrium is reached if v  lies within the cone determined by 1
av  
and 2
av  (factor market clearing condition). 
[Figure 1] 
It is apparent from figure 1 that the output pattern is determined by commodity prices, the 
production technologies and the factor endowments of the economy. To see this, remember 
that all possible equilibrium factor price combinations are elements of frontier GF . Then, 
according to figure 1, the economy could be completely specialized on integrated production 
in sector 1 if it were more K abundant, so that the steeper line φ  would be tangent to frontier 
GF  at a point above A. 
                                                 
10 Remember, ( ) ( ), ,f a a g a ai K L i K Lc w w c w w≠  from above. 
11 Noteworthy, in figure 1 the ranking of technologies according to their factor intensities 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 2g f g fφ ⋅ > φ ⋅ > φ ⋅ > φ ⋅  is arbitrarily chosen. Sector 1 produces K-intensive in the non-outsourcing 
equilibrium, since ( ) ( )1 2, ,f a a g a aK L K Lw w w wφ > φ . 
12 Compare Dixit and Norman (1980) and Wong (1995) for a discussion. 
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3.2 The Outsourcing Equilibrium 
If factor prices are not equalized by final goods trade, a decline in trade costs for intermediate 
goods13, i.e. a decline in *ic , may imply an incentive for firms to exploit international factor 
price differences by outsourcing part of the value added chain to abroad. Thus, firms in sector 
i have at given non-outsourcing equilibrium factor prices aKw , 
a
Lw  economical access to 
international outsourcing if ( ) ( )*, , ,a a a a ai K L i i K Lc w w c c w w≤γ , according to (3), (4), (6) and (10). 
Moreover, firms in sector i have access to cost-saving international outsourcing if 
 ( ) ( )*, , ,a a a a ai K L i i K Lc w w c c w w<γ , (14) 
with ( ),a a a ii K Lc w w p= , according to (11) and (12). Since it is straight forward that economical 
access does not change factor prices if international outsourcing is not cost-saving, i.e. if 
( ) ( )*, , ,a a a a ai K L i i K Lc w w c c w w=γ , I do ignore this case in the following analysis. 
Let iβ , 1,2i = , be implicitly defined by 
 ( ) ( )*, , ,i a i a a a ai K L i i K Lc w w c c w wγ β β = . (15) 
Then, according to (14), a cost-saving effect of international outsourcing in sector i at non-
outsourcing equilibrium factor prices aKw , 
a
Lw  arises if and only if 1
iβ > . Firms in both 
sectors have at given aKw , 
a
Lw  simultaneously access to cost-saving international outsourcing, 
if 1β > , with ( )1 2min ,β ≡ β β . Finally, the cost-saving effect is higher in sector 1 if 1 2β > β  
and it is more pronounced in sector 2 if 1 2β < β . With respect to its impact on factor 
intensities, international outsourcing is said to substitute factor L, if 
( ) ( ), ,a a a a ai K L i K Lw w w wγφ > φ  and to substitute factor K if ( ) ( ), ,a a a a ai K L i K Lw w w wγφ < φ . Finally, 
international outsourcing is neutral if ( ) ( ), ,a a a a ai K L i K Lw w w wγφ = φ . Compare the definition of 
( )aiφ ⋅  and ( )iγφ ⋅ , according to (7)-(9) and (13). 
Define for any given ( ),K Lw w  
                                                 
13 Besides declining tariffs and legal non-tariff barriers Jones (2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski (1990, 2001) 
point out that declining costs for service links, which are required for coordination and communication activities, 
are of special relevance for explaining the increase in international outsourcing. 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* *, , min , , , ,b ai K L i i K L i K L ic w w c c w w c w w cγ≡ , (16) 
according to (6) and (10). Then, factor prices in the diversified outsourcing equilibrium 
,b bK Lw w  are determined by the zero profit conditions 
 ( )* 11 1, ,b K Lc w w c p=  and (17) 
 ( )* 22 2, ,b K Lc w w c p= . (18) 
Of course, factor markets have to be cleared in equilibrium. It is apparent from the discussion 
following figure 1 that the output pattern in the outsourcing equilibrium is determined by 
commodity prices ip , the production technologies and the factor endowments of the 
economy. Similar to the discussion of the non-outsourcing equilibrium it is possible to define 
a feasible set B , which contains all ( ),K Lw w  combinations that satisfy the constraints 
( )b iic p⋅ ≥ , 1,2i = . Then, the lower frontier BF  of set B  contains all possible ( ),K Lw w  
combinations in the outsourcing equilibrium. It is worth noting that ⊂B G  is a direct 
consequence of to 1β > . Compare figure 2 below. A formal characterization of B  and BF  is 
given in the appendix. 
4 The Distributional Effects of International Outsourcing 
To refrain from (uninteresting) border line cases, in the following I assume that 
( ) ( )1 2, ,a aK L K Lw w w wφ ≠ φ  and ( ) ( )1 2, ,K L K Lw w w wγ γφ ≠ φ . Then, the impact of international 
outsourcing on relative factor returns can be summarized in the following way. 
Theorem 1 Assume that economical access to international outsourcing comprises at non-
outsourcing equilibrium factor prices aKw , 
a
Lw  a cost-saving effect in both sectors. Then, 
under diversification the following holds:  
(i) If both sectors are engaged in international outsourcing and the cost-saving effect of 
outsourcing is highest in sector i, the relative return increases in favor of the factor 
intensively used in sector i  in the outsourcing equilibrium. 
(ii) If only one sector employs the outsourcing technology in equilibrium, the relative return 
increases in favor of the factor intensively used in the outsourcing sector. 
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Proof. See the appendix.   
Figure 2 represents a situation where international outsourcing decreases costs in the K-
intensive production of sector 1 relative to the costs of L-intensive production in sector 2. 
Outsourcing substitutes factor L in both sectors, i.e. ( ) ( )1 1aγφ ⋅ > φ ⋅  and ( ) ( )2 2aγφ ⋅ > φ ⋅ . 
[Figure 2] 
It is obvious from figure 2 that the relative cost saving effect of international outsourcing at 
non-outsourcing equilibrium factor prices ,a aK Lw w  is neutral, i.e. 1 2 1β = β > , if the intersection 
point of the two unit isocost curves associated with international outsourcing lies on the 
dotted aω -line in figure 2, where /a a aK Lw wω ≡  is used. But, if the cost-saving effect in sector 
1 is higher than the cost-saving effect in sector 2, i.e. if 1 2 1β > β > , the unit isocost curve of 
sector 1 shifts more than that of sector 2 yielding an intersection point below the aω -line in 
the case of ( ) ( )1 2γ γφ ⋅ > φ ⋅ . This is drawn in figure 2. Moreover, be aware that the economy will 
end up on BF  (the lower frontier of feasible set B ) in the outsourcing equilibrium. Formally, 
( ),b bK Lw w ∈ BF . Then, for a given frontier BF , the outsourcing equilibrium is determined by 
the relative endowment of the economy. Since vector v , which is in point B perpendicular to 
the line indicating the relative factor endowment of the economy φ , lies within the cone 
determined by 1
bv  and 2
bv , B describes the outsourcing equilibrium.14 (In B both sectors make 
use of the outsourcing technologies only.) The output pattern in the outsourcing equilibrium is 
(as in the non-outsourcing equilibrium) determined by commodity prices, the production 
technologies and the factor endowments of the economy. In the outsourcing equilibrium the 
economy could be completely specialized on the outsourcing production in sector 1 if the 
economy were more K-abundant, so that the steeper line φ  would be tangent to frontier BF  
at a point above B. However, the economy could as well be specialized on the outsourcing 
technology in sector 2, if the outsourcing technology in sector 2 were more K-intensive, so 
that line φ  would be tangent to BF  at a point below B. This immediately shows that the 
factor contents of the outsourced components matter for the output pattern of the economy. 
                                                 
14 biv  denotes the vector which is at factor prices 
b
Kw ,
b
Lw  perpendicular to frontier ( )*, ,b ii K L ic w w c p= , 
1, 2i = . 
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However, according to figure 2, one may think that at least under diversification it is solely 
the sector bias which matters for international outsourcing. But, this conclusion is not valid. 
In figure 3 both sectors make use of international outsourcing in equilibrium. Moreover, 
( ) ( )1 2, ,a aK L K Lw w w wφ > φ  and ( ) ( )1 2, ,K L K Lw w w wγ γφ < φ  hold, so that the ranking of sectors 
according to their factor intensities is affected by international outsourcing.15 
[Figure 3] 
Although it is again the K-intensive sector 1 in which at non-outsourcing equilibrium factor 
prices ,a aK Lw w  the cost-saving effect of international outsourcing is most pronounced, it is 
factor L which gains relative to factor K from access to international outsourcing. The reason 
is that although the production in sector 1 is K-intensive in the non-outsourcing equilibrium it 
turns out to be L-intensive in the outsourcing equilibrium. It is the ranking of sectors 
according to their factor intensities in the outsourcing (and not in the non-outsourcing) 
equilibrium which matters for the distributional effects of international outsourcing. Thus, the 
factor contents of the outsourced components are relevant for the distributional effects of 
international outsourcing. 
Due to the cost-saving effect, i.e. 1β > , it is apparent that at least one sector is engaged in 
international outsourcing in the outsourcing equilibrium. However, non-outsourcing 
technologies are not necessarily substituted by outsourcing techniques in both sectors in 
equilibrium. Figure 4 draws a case in which sector 2 does not make use of international 
outsourcing in the outsourcing equilibrium despite the cost-saving effect of international 
outsourcing in sector 2 at non-outsourcing equilibrium factor prices ,a aK Lw w . 
[Figure 4] 
Finally, in figures 2-4 it is the factor intensively used in sector 1 (in the outsourcing 
equilibrium) that gains relative to the other factor and it is sector 1 in which the cost-saving 
effect of international outsourcing at non-outsourcing equilibrium factor prices is highest. 
However, this is not necessarily the case if only one sector makes use of the outsourcing 
technology in equilibrium. To see this consider figure 5 where outsourcing substitutes factor L 
in both sectors and the cost-saving effect of international outsourcing is highest in sector 1. 
However, it is only the production of sector 2 which makes use of international outsourcing in 
                                                 
15 Note that in figure 3 outsourcing substitutes factor K in sector 1 and factor L in sector 2. 
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equilibrium, whereas in sector 1 both intermediate inputs of the fragmented production are 
produced in home. 
[Figure 5] 
Since sector 2 turns out to be the K-intensive one in the outsourcing equilibrium, i.e. 
( ) ( )2 1, ,b b g b bK L K Lw w w wγφ > φ , it is factor K which gains relative to factor L from the cost-saving 
access to international outsourcing. 
5 Can Outsourcing have a Pareto-improving impact on factor 
prices? 
So far the analysis has focused on the question of how cost-saving access to international 
outsourcing affects relative factor rewards. This section confronts the issue of international 
outsourcing with the Pareto-criterion. The main findings are summarized in theorem 2. 
Theorem 2 Assume that economical access to international outsourcing comprises at non-
outsourcing equilibrium factor prices aKw , 
a
Lw  a cost-saving effect in both sectors. Then, 
under diversification (i) at least one factor gains and (ii) a Pareto-improvement may arise. 
Proof. See the appendix.   
Corollary 1 A Pareto-improvement of international outsourcing is only possible if 
outsourcing technologies totally substitute the integrated and fragmented production mode, 
as described by (1) and (2), in equilibrium. 
Proof. Directly follows from the properties of frontier GF .   
Part (i) of theorem 2 is a direct consequence of the cost-saving effect of international 
outsourcing, i.e. 1β > . Since international outsourcing means that resources are more 
efficiently allocated, there is a potential for a Pareto-improvement in the sense that winners 
are able to compensate losers via lump-sum transfers. Thus, at least one factor gains from 
international outsourcing. 
Moreover, a Pareto-improving impact of international outsourcing (without redistributional 
measures) may arise. Consider first that all firms in both sectors are engaged in international 
outsourcing in equilibrium, i.e. technologies f and g are totally substituted by the outsourcing 
production mode. In figures 2 and 3 both factors gain from an access to cost-saving 
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international outsourcing. However, it is  clear from figure 2 that a Pareto-improving factor 
price effect can only arise if the cost-saving effect of international outsourcing in the two 
sectors is not too different.16 If the cost-saving effect of international outsourcing in sector 1 is 
such that point B′  instead of B describes the diversified outsourcing equilibrium in figure 2, 
the return to factor L declines although both sectors are engaged in international outsourcing 
in equilibrium. 
Finally, it is apparent from figures 4 and 5 that a Pareto-improving factor price effect of 
international outsourcing is not possible as long as either integrated technology f or 
fragmented technology g determined by (1) or (2), respectively, survive in one sector. In 
figure 4 point B indicates an outsourcing equilibrium in which the fragmented technology 
without international outsourcing survives in sector 2. In equilibrium point B b aK Kw w>  and 
b a
L Lw w<  hold, implying that factor L loses from international outsourcing.
17 
6 Extensions 
So far I have analyzed the impact of international outsourcing on factor prices if firms in both 
sectors have economical access to cost-saving international outsourcing at non-outsourcing 
equilibrium factor prices ,a aK Lw w . Thereby, it has been shown that economical access to cost-
saving international outsourcing of firms in both sectors does not necessarily mean that firms 
in both sectors are actually engaged in outsourcing activities in equilibrium. Compare 
equilibrium outcome B in figure 4. Moreover, to be used in equilibrium the outsourcing 
production mode has not to be cost-saving at ,a aK Lw w . This is shown in figure 6, where 
fragmented production in the L-intensive sector 2 exhibits lower unit costs at factor prices 
,a aK Lw w  than the outsourcing production mode, i.e. ( ) ( )* 22 2 2, , ,a a a a aK L K Lc w w c c w w pγ > = . In 
contrast, firms in sector 1 have at ,a aK Lw w  economical access to cost-saving international 
outsourcing since ( ) ( )* 11 1 1, , ,a a a a aK L K Lc w w c c w w pγ < =  holds. Then, the adjustment of factor 
                                                 
16 It can easily be seen that the new equilibrium lies on the aω -line to the right and above of point A in figure 2, 
if the cost-saving effect is of equal size in both sectors and technologies f and g are totally substituted by the 
outsourcing production mode in the diversified outsourcing equilibrium. This guarantees a Pareto-improvement. 
17 Noteworthy, the result that one factor loses if a non-outsourcing technology is in use in the outsourcing 
equilibrium is a direct consequence of the fact that in the ( ),K Lw w -space GF  is strictly falling and convex. 
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prices induced by outsourcing in sector 1 may cause a cost-saving advantage of the 
outsourcing production mode also in sector 2, so that both sectors may be engaged in 
outsourcing activities in equilibrium. In figure 6 factor prices in the outsourcing equilibrium 
are given by ,b bK Lw w  with ( ) ( )* *, , , ,b b b b bi K L i i K L ic w w c c w w cγ =  and ( )*, ,b b ii K L ic w w c pγ =  for 
1,2i = . According to theorem 1, the factor intensively used in sector 1 in the outsourcing 
equilibrium gains relative to the other factor. 
[Figure 6] 
However, in this case a Pareto-improvement is not possible. To see this, note that a Pareto-
improvement implies b aK Kw w≥  and 
b a
L Lw w≥  where at least one inequality holds strictly. But 
this cannot be an equilibrium outcome if ( ) ( )* 22 2 2, , ,a a a a aK L K Lc w w c c w w pγ > =  since minimal 
unit isocost functions are strictly increasing in factor prices. Assuming that international 
outsourcing in sector 2 is economically attractive but not cost-saving, i.e. assuming that 
( ) ( )*2 2, , ,a a a a aK L i K Lc w w c c w wγ = , does not alter these results. 
Finally, one may consider that only one sector has technological access to international 
outsourcing. This is the case most prominently discussed in the literature18 and may be seen as 
special case of the more comprehensive analysis in this paper. As long as the focus lies on 
diversification equilibria the impact of international outsourcing on relative factor rewards is 
represented by part (ii) of theorem 1. According to theorem 2, a Pareto-improvement in the 
case of a diversified outsourcing equilibrium is not possible if only one sector can has access 
to international outsourcing. 
7 Summary 
The analysis in this paper investigates the distributional effects of international outsourcing in 
a two sector Heckscher-Ohlin type model. With respect to the discussion of factor-biased 
versus sector-biased effects of international outsourcing, it is shown that this distinction is 
misleading in the case of international outsourcing in both sectors. Since sectors may be 
differently ranked according to their factor intensities in the non-outsourcing and the 
outsourcing equilibrium, not only the cost-saving effects of outsourcing but also the factor 
                                                 
18 Compare among others Arndt (1997, 1999), Deardorff (2001a, 2001b), Egger and Falkinger (2001), Jones and 
Kierzkowski (2001) and Kohler (2001a). 
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contents of the outsourced fragments are relevant for the distributional effects of international 
outsourcing. 
Concerning the Pareto-criterion the analysis in this paper shows that the more efficient 
allocation of resources results in a potential for a Pareto-improvement via redistributional 
measures of the government. However, if outsourcing arises in both sectors, it may even yield 
a Pareto-improvement without any policy intervention. This has so far been neglected in the 
literature, due to its restriction on outsourcing within one sector only. 
Appendix 
A Formal Characterization of Set G  and Frontier GF  
Let iG , 1,2i = , be the upper contour set of all pairs ( ),K Lw w  for which ( ),a ii K Lc w w p≥  
holds, according to (10)-(12). Then, 1 2∩G G  defines feasible set G . In addition, let 
iGF  be 
the set of all pairs ( ),K Lw w  for which ( ),a ii K Lc w w p=  holds, according to (10)-(12). Then, 
iGF  is the frontier set iG  and ( )1 2≡ ∩ ∪G G GF G F F  defines the lower frontier of feasible 
set G . 
A Formal Characterization of Set B  and Frontier BF  
Let iB , 1,2i = , be the upper contour set of all pairs ( ),K Lw w  for which ( )*, ,b ii K L ic w w c p≥  
holds, according to (16)-(18). Then, 1 2∩B B  defines feasible set B . In addition, let 
iBF  be 
the set of all pairs ( ),K Lw w  for which ( )*, ,b ii K L ic w w c p=  holds, according to (16)-(18). 
Then, ( )1 2≡ ∩ ∪B B BF B F F  is the lower frontier of feasible set B . Thereby, ⊂B G  holds 
if 1β > . 
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Proof of Theorem 1 
Proof of part (i): Let ( ),K Lw wγ γ  be the factor prices implicitly defined by19 
 ( )* 11 1, ,K Lc w w c pγ =  and (19) 
 ( )* 22 2, ,K Lc w w c pγ = . (20) 
Moreover, define 
 ( ) ( ){ }, , / /u i a ai K L i K L K L K Lw w c w w p w w w wγ≡ = ∧ ≥R  as well as (21) 
 ( ) ( ){ }, , / /l i a ai K L i K L K L K Lw w c w w p w w w wγ≡ = ∧ ≤R , (22) 
for 1,2i = . Now assume first that i jβ > β , where { }1,2i∈  and { }1, 2j∈  with i j≠  and 
remember 1β > , with ( )1 2min ,β = β β . Then, the following holds: If 
( ) ( ), ,i K L j K Lw w w wγ γφ > φ , then {}lj∩ =BF R , according to the factor intensity assumptions 
and the definition of frontier BF . Therefore, / /a aK L K Lw w w w
γ γ ≤  cannot hold in equilibrium if 
both sectors make use of international outsourcing. Moreover, note that if {}uj∩ ≠
BF R  then 
( ),K Lw wγ γ ∈ BF .20 ( ),K Lw wγ γ ∈ BF  and ( ),K Lw wγ γ ∉ GF  together with 
( ) ( ), , ,j K L i K Lw w w wγ γ γ γ γ γ φ∈ φ φ  21, guarantee a diversified equilibrium with both sectors 
making use of international outsourcing and relative factor prices / /a aK L K Lw w w w
γ γ > .22 In 
                                                 
19 Due to assumption of no factor intensity reversal and since ( ) ( )1 2γ γφ ⋅ ≠ φ ⋅ , (19) and (20) define a unique pair 
( ),K Lw wγ γ . 
20 Be aware that {}ui∩ ≠
BF R  is guaranteed by the definition of BF , and the assumptions i jβ > β  and 
( ) ( ), ,i K L j K Lw w w wγ γφ > φ . 
21 Be aware that ( ) ( ), ,,j K L i K Lw w w wγ γ γ γ γ γφ ∈ φ φ    is a necessary condition for a diversified equilibrium with 
international outsourcing in both sectors. 
22 Of course there may also be a diversified equilibrium with both sectors making use of international 
outsourcing if ( ),K Lw wγ γ ∈ BF  and ( ),K Lw wγ γ ∈ GF . However, in this case it is not guaranteed that indeed both 
sectors make use of international outsourcing at factor prices ,K Lw w
γ γ . The reason is that in one sector firms are 
indifferent between using one of the non-outsourcing technologies (indicated by f or g) and the outsourcing 
production mode. However, if both sectors make use of international outsourcing in equilibrium, part (i) of 
theorem 1 as well as its proof are relevant. 
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accordance, if ( ) ( ), ,i K L j K Lw w w wγ γφ < φ , then {}uj∩ =BF R . Therefore, / /a aK L K Lw w w wγ γ <  
must hold in a diversified equilibrium if both sectors make use of international outsourcing. 
Second, if i jβ = β  then / /a aK L K Lw w w wγ γ =  and ( ),K Lw wγ γ ∈ BF . Moreover, according to 1β > , 
( ),K Lw wγ γ ∉ GF . Then, ( ),K Lw wγ γ ∈ BF  and ( ) ( ), , ,i K L j K Lw w w wγ γ γ γ γ γ φ∈ φ φ  , guarantee a 
diversified equilibrium with both sectors making use of international outsourcing. This 
completes the proof of part (i).23   
Proof of part (ii): Let ,K Lw w
η η  be implicitly determined by 
 ( )*, , ii K L ic w w c pγ =  and (23) 
 ( ),a jj K Lc w w p= , (24) 
according to (6) and (10)-(12), where sector j does not employ the outsourcing technology 
γ .24 Thereby, { }1,2i∈ , { }1, 2j∈  and i j≠  is considered. Define 
 ( ) ( ){ }, ,f f jj K L j K Lw w c w w p≡ ∩ =GC F  and  (25) 
 ( ) ( ){ }, ,g g jj K L j K Lw w c w w p≡ ∩ =GC F . (26) 
Moreover use 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }
min , , , , , / /
,
max , , , , , / /
f g a a
j K L j K L K L K L K L K L
j K L f g a a
j K L j K L K L K L K L K L
w w w w w w w w w w w w
w w
w w w w w w w w w w w w
η
 φ φ ∀ ∈ <
φ = 
φ φ ∀ ∈ >

 
to define 
 ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
, ,
, , ,
, ,
f f g
j K L K L j j
j g g f
K L j K L K L j j
f g
j K L K L j j
w w w w
w w w w w w
w w w wη
φ ∀ ∈

φ ≡ φ ∀ ∈

φ ∀ ∈ ∩

C \C
C \C
C C
. (27) 
Similar to the proof of part (i) we first assume that sector i is the K-intensive one in the 
outsourcing equilibrium, i.e. ( ),i K Lw wγ η ηφ > φ . Then, if 
                                                 
23 Note that if ,K Lw w
γ γ  describe factor prices in the outsourcing equilibrium, then bK Kw w
γ
=  and bL Lw w
γ
= , 
according to (17) and (18). 
24 For a simultaneous use of a non-outsourcing and the outsourcing technology in sector j compare the discussion 
in footnote 22 and the proof of part (i) of theorem 1. Moreover, note that if sector j uses a non-outsourcing 
technology, sector i must use the outsourcing technology in equilibrium, which is a direct consequence of 1β > .  
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 ( ) ( ){ }, / / {}f g a aj j K L K L K Lw w w w w w∪ ∩ < =C C , 
( ) ( ){ }, , / /a aK L K L K L K Lw w w w w w w wη η ∉ ∩ <GF  follows immediately from (25) and (26). 
Moreover, if 
 ( ) ( ){ }, / / {}f g a aj j K L K L K Lw w w w w w∪ ∩ < ≠C C , 
then ( ),j K Lw wφ > φ  for all ( ) ( ){ }, , / /a aK L K L K L K Lw w w w w w w w∈ ∩ <Z , with f gj j≡ ∪Z C C . 
This is a direct consequence of the convexity of feasible set G , the definition of GF  and the 
assumption that minimal unit isocost curves are increasing in factor prices. Be aware that both 
( ),i K Lw wγ η ηφ > φ  and ( ),j K Lw wη ηφ > φ  cannot simultaneously hold in a diversified equilibrium 
described by (23) and (24). This proves that ( ) ( ){ }, , / /a aK L K L K L K Lw w w w w w w wη η ∉ ∩ <GF  if 
( ),i K Lw wγ η ηφ > φ . 
In addition, it is obvious that if 
 ( ) ( ){ }( ), / / {}f g a aj j K L K L K Lw w w w w w∪ ∩ > ≠C C , 
then ( ),j K Lw wφ < φ  for all ( ) ( ){ }, , / /a aK L K L K L K Lw w w w w w w w∈ ∩ >Z . This follows 
immediately from the convexity of feasible set G , the definition of GF  and the assumption 
that minimal unit isocost curves are increasing in factor prices. Be aware that 
( ) ( ), , ,j K L i K Lw w w wη η γ η η φ∈ φ φ   must hold in a diversified equilibrium described by (23) and 
(24) which is the case if ( ),j K Lw wη ηφ < φ . Then, if ( ),K Lw wη η ∈ ∩G BF F  (23) and (24) describe 
a diversified equilibrium with / /a aK L K Lw w w w
η η > . Finally, due to ( ),K Lw wη η ∈ ∩G BF F  and 
1β > , / /a aK L K Lw w w wη η =  cannot hold in a diversified equilibrium described by (23) and (24). 
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In the same way it can be shown that if ( ),i K Lw wγ η ηφ < φ , according to 
( ) ( ), , ,K Kji L Lw w w wγ η η η η φ∈ φ φ   and ( ),K Lw wη η ∈ ∩G BF F , (23) and (24) describe a diversified 
equilibrium with / /a aK L K Lw w w w
η η < . This concludes the proof of part (ii) of theorem 1. 25 
Proof of Theorem 2 
Proof of part (i): Denote with ( ),a aK Lw w ∈ GF  factor prices in the diversified non-outsourcing 
equilibrium and with ( ),b bK Lw w ∈ BF  factor prices in the diversified outsourcing equilibrium, 
according to (11)-(12) and (17)-(18), respectively. Then, it is a direct consequence of the 
convexity of feasible set G , the definition of GF  and the assumption that minimal unit 
isocost curves are increasing in factor prices that b aK Kw w>  if 
b a
L Lw w≤  and that 
b a
L Lw w>  if 
b a
K Kw w≤  must hold in equilibrium, since ⊂B G , according to 1β > .26   
Proof of part (ii): Define 
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ){ }, min , 0 ,a a a aK L K K L L K Lw w w w w w w w ≡ − − ≥ P   (28) 
as the set of factor prices ( ),K Lw w  which are Pareto-superior to ( ),a aK Lw w . Note that by 
definition ⊂P G . Moreover, since {}∩ ≠P B 27, a Pareto-improving factor price impact of 
international outsourcing may arise.   
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